Experimental studies have suggested that variables such as aptness or conventionality are predictors of people’s preference for expressing a particular topic–vehicle pair as either a metaphor or a simile. In the present study, we investigated if such variables would also be predictive within a more naturalistic context, where other variables, such as the intention to include an explanation, may also influence people’s decision. Specifically, we investigated the production of metaphor and simile expressions on the Internet via the Google search engine (...) and checked for accompanying explanations, as well as the properties they expressed, to examine whether ratings such as aptness, conventionality, as well as participants’ own stated preference or the intention to produce an explanation, would predict which topic–vehicle pairs appeared more often as metaphor. We found that participants’ stated preference predicted metaphor dominance on the Internet, and that apt topic–vehicles occurred more often as metaphors. The explanations collected, however, occurred 82% of the time after similes, and familiar expressions were the most explained. Finally, comparing the properties expressed in these explanations to normed property lists, we found that simile explanations typically expressed a novel conception of the topic–vehicle relationship. Therefore, we found that Internet posters use metaphors to convey an apt relationship, as found in previous laboratory studies, but prefer using a simile frame when they want to express a relationship that readers will find novel. (shrink)

The research analyzes the teledentistry service applied in health services during COVID-19, studying the quality of the teledentistry service and the level of satisfaction of patients treated with this care model. A sample of 341 patients was worked on, using the SERVQUAL model. The results showed a statistically significant relationship between quality of service in teledentistry and patient satisfaction (p<0.05), where 34.9% patients perceived low quality of service and dissatisfaction, while 33.7% were pleased with the care. We conclude that, given (...) the dental health difficulties, the population of the Peruvian central jungle is dissatisfied with the teledentistry service. (shrink)

O presente estudo tem por objetivo a análise da prevalência de mobbing numa amostra de trabalhadores de centros de apoio a pessoas com deficiências. Utilizando uma amostra de 67 profissionais, e mediante um questionário formado por 30 itens, elaborado a partir do Leymann Inventory Psychological Terr..

Las ideas expuestas por José Eusebio Caro en su obra inconclusa intitulada Mecánica social o Teoría del movimiento humano, considerado en su naturaleza, en sus efectos y en sus causas, en 1836, recoge aspectos característicos del pensamiento de las primeras décadas del Siglo XIX, con raíces algunas de ellas en ápocas anteriores. La riqueza intelectual de la obra en mención indujo la investigación analítica, de la cual da cuenta este documento, según la siguiente pregunta de investigación: ¿Cuáles son los (...) rasgos epistemológicos predominantes en las tesis filosóficas y sociológicas de José Eusebio Caro, en su obra póstuma inconclusa intitulada Mecánica social o teoría del movimiento humano, considerado en su naturaleza, en sus efectos y en sus causas? El estudio en torno a esta obra se concentra en precisar aspectos epistemológicos de una propuesta que comparte honores con el positivismo y con el surgimiento de la teoría social cuyas tesis dan paso al surgimiento de la sociología. Esto, en un particular siglo caracterizado por la búsqueda de la originalidad ideológica y política del continente americano, que esperaba resurgir lejos de la dominación española y cerca de los teóricos franceses y de los desarrollos ideológicos de Inglaterra. (shrink)

This article aims to examine the notion of pleasure as a telos of the happy life in Epicurus. Understood as the first good and inherent to the human being, pleasure is presented as the beginning and the ultimate end of a happy life. Indeed, it should be noted that it is not the pleasures of the common people that Epicurus considers as the telos of a happy life, but the pleasure that is the absence of suffering in body and soul, (...) which is named by Epicurus of katastematic pleasure or static/at rest pleasure. In this sense, two concerns guide the present work: i) that of presenting pleasure as a telos of a happy life; ii) to expose the strict meaning that the concept of pleasure assumes in Epicurean philosophy, paying attention to the distinction between pleasure in movement and pleasure at rest. The present study is based mainly on passages from the epistle to Meneceus, in some Main Maxims and Vatican Sentences, texts in which Epicurus exposes the foundations of his hedonism, as well as in the testimonies of later disciples, such as Tito Lucrécio Caro, Diogenes Laertius and Diogenes de Enoanda. (shrink)

Uma das peculiaridades instigantes desse livro, caro leitor, é a sobreposição dos temas, que desdobram e estratificam leituras preparadas por especialistas de diversas áreas de conhecimento. Penetrando no mesmo tema por diversas perspectivas, quem o lê se aproxima não somente de Max Weber, mas acaba se familiarizando, inclusive, com o modo pelo qual seu pensamento está aderido às diversas ciências que ainda hoje procuram compreender a herança da nossa modernidade. Com espírito interdisciplinar, apresentamos a você, leitor, esses textos oriundos (...) de pesquisadores de diferentes disciplinas. E se pedimos a sua leitura, é porque consideramos que eles representam um bom exemplo da atual produção latino-americana da Weberforschung. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

Today most philosophers in the English-speaking world adhere to “naturalist” credos that philosophy is continuous with science, and that the natural sciences provide a complete account of all that exists. This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism in order to defend a more inclusive or liberal naturalism.

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021 ; Vaccarezza et al. 2023 ; De Caro et al. forthcoming ). According to this (...) model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness _tout court_, i.e., as the _ratio essendi_ of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives. (shrink)

This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism not in the name of some form of supernaturalism, but in order to defend a ...

Scientific naturalism—the conception according to which the natural sciences, and possibly physics alone, set the limits of ontology and epistemology—is characterized by a strong monistic tendency. For this reason, all versions of scientific naturalism face the so-called “placement problem”, which concerns the features of the ordinary view of the world that, at least prima facie, do not fit into the scientific view of the world (think of consciousness, moral properties, free will, and intentionality). To address this problem, scientific naturalists use (...) three strategies: reductionism, eliminativism, and mysterianism—none of which, it is argued, produces satisfying results. Liberal naturalism opts instead for a pluralistic attitude in both ontology and epistemology but accepts a constraint according to which one should accept no entity or explanation that is incompatible with the scientific worldview. Liberal naturalism faces the “reconciliation problem”, which concerns the relationship between the scientific and the ordinary views of the world once one denies ontological and epistemological priority to either of them. Three strategies for addressing this problem are presented: according to the first, the ordinary worldview and the scientific world are categorically distinct; according to the second, the former emerges from the latter; according to the third, between them there is a relation of global supervenience. Other objections to liberal naturalism are finally presented and addressed. (shrink)

The article discusses the origin of the split between common sense and the scientific view of the world, which took lace at the beginning of the modern age. More specifically, it shows how Galileo...

Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that (...) there must be a transcendent realm of norms. _Naturalism and Normativity_ engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism. They articulate a liberal conception of philosophy that is neither reducible to the sciences nor completely independent of them—yet one that maintains the right to call itself naturalism. Contributors think in new ways about the relations among the scientific worldview, our experience of norms and values, and our movements in the space of reason. Detailed discussions include the relationship between philosophy and science, physicalism and ontological pluralism, the realm of the ordinary, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and justification, and the liberal naturalisms of Donald Davidson, John Dewey, John McDowell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the relevance of quantum mechanics to the free-will debate has been discussed at length, especially in relation to the prospects of libertarianism. Basing his interpretation on Anscombe’s seminal work, Putnam argued in 1979 that, given that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is holistic at the macrolevel—i.e., it is not traceable to atomistic events such as quantum jumps of single atoms—it can provide libertarians with the kind of freedom they seek. As shown in this article, however, Putnam ultimately (...) reached the conclusion—together with the other author of this article—that his argument was wrong due to problems with the way it appealed to the Uncertainty Principle.**. (shrink)

The recent discussions on the unity of virtue suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, (...) at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom and, then, to assess and rationally adjust such attribution of competence via actual engagement with them – a process that may lead to different responses on the part of the interpreter. After expounding and defending the Principle of Phronetic Charity and the interpretive practices connected with it, we discuss the repercussions of our account on the issue of the epistemic access to virtue. We will show, in particular, that some important components of both disunitarianism and unitarianism have to be retained: in accordance with the former, we stress the role of concrete experience over pure speculation and, up to a point, the idea that virtues tend to form variegated ensembles; in accordance with the latter, we accept the claim that virtues are not attributed to moral agents in isolation. Ultimately, however, the account developed here rejects both the atomism of the disunitarian view and the holism of the “Unity of the Virtues”, since it is in fact a form of molecularism, according to which virtues come neither individually nor as a whole, but rather as clusters. (shrink)

This is the first collection to present a comprehensive overview of liberal naturalism. Essential reading for students and researchers in all areas of philosophy it will be of particular interest for those studying philosophical naturalism, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and ethics.

It is very contentious whether the features of the manifest image have a place in the world as it is described by natural science. For the advocates of strict naturalism, this is a serious problem, which has been labelled ‘placement problem’. In this light, some of them try to show that those features are reducible to scientifically acceptable ones. Others, instead, argue that the features of the manifest image are mere illusions and, consequently, have to be eliminated from our ontology. (...) In brief, the two options that are open to strict naturalists for solving the placement problem are ontological reductionism and eliminativism. Other advocates of naturalist philosophy, however, claim that both these strategies fail and, consequently, opt for ‘mysterianism’, the view according to which we cannot give up the recalcitrant features of the manifest image even if we are not able to understand the ways in which they could be reduced to the scientific features. Mysterianism has the merit of facing the difficulties that whoever wants to explain reductively, or explain away, the features of the manifest image encounters. It is also a defeatist philosophical view, though, since it considers the most important philosophical problems as unsolvable mysteries. For this reason, I argue that mysterianism can also be taken as a reductio of strict naturalism, given its presumption that all phenomena are either explainable by the natural sciences or to be rejected as illusory. In this article, it is argued that the failures of reductionism, eliminativism and mysterianism should teach us that both the scientific image and the manifest image of the world are essential and mutually irreducible but not incompatible with each other. To support this claim, in the second part of the article, the case of free will is discussed. (shrink)

The study of responsibility in ethics focuses on the nature of agency, accountability, blame, punishment and, crucially, the distribution of responsibility for complex ethical problems. Work in social ontology examines the nature of entities such as groups, organizations, corporations, and institutions, and what it is for these entities to have intentional states and to act. Until recently, these fields of research have mostly been treated separately. The goal of this issue is to examine emerging research at their intersection. The papers (...) gathered here explore both normative dimensions of work in social ontology and metaphysical assumptions and implications of ethical theorizing about collective responsibility. (shrink)

In her recent volume Habitual Ethics?,1 Sylvie Delacroix writes that habits are the ‘black holes of social sciences’. These phenomena are not studied enough, she argues, and (for the little they ar...

The paper discusses Maurizio Ferraris’ Documentalità by raising two objections. The first objection concerns Ferraris’ view that, in the case of all natural entities, there cannot be differences in the way a normal adult, a little child and an animal perceive them. It is claimed that this is not true for objects such as the sun that we (differently from little children and animals) cannot help perceiving as a gigantic hot celestial body. The second objection concerns the thesis that all (...) social objects presuppose a written act. In this case the claim is that it is unclear which philosophy of mind can support such a view. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 624-628, October 2011.

_:_ This metacomment on Dennett’s comment on Sam Harris’s book on free will examines two issues. First, how one should conceive of the relationship between philosophy and science, in particular considering the dismissive attitude many highly regarded scientists show towards philosophy today. Second, a critical assessment of Harris’s replies to Dennett’s criticisms. _Keywords:_ Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris; Free Will; Science; Philosophy _In difesa dei vincoli avuncolari. Dennett e Harris sul rapporto tra filosofia e scienza_ _Riassunto:_ Questo metacommento sulle osservazioni avanzate (...) da Dennett sul libro di Sam Harris sul libero arbitrio verte su due questioni. In primo luogo, discute come si dovrebbe concepire il rapporto tra filosofia e scienza, in particolar modo considerando l’atteggiamento sprezzante mostrato oggi nei confronti della filosofia da diversi scienziati molto in vista. In secondo luogo saranno oggetto di valutazione critica le risposte di Harris alle critiche di Dennett. _Parole chiave: _Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Scienza; Filosofia. (shrink)

The critical concern of the present volume is contemporary naturalism, both in its scientific version and as represented by newly emerging hopes for another, philosophically more liberal, naturalism.1 The papers collected here are state-of-the-art discussions that question the appeal, rational motivations, and presuppositions of scientific naturalism across a broad range of philosophical topics. As an alternative to scientific naturalism, we offer the outlines of a new non- reductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided (...) by the natural sciences. Our authors collectively believe that holding scientific naturalism up for philosophical scrutiny and challenging its misconceptions is of the first importance both for understanding ourselves and our place in the world; and, also, for the future direction of philosophy itself. (shrink)

What aesthetic interest do we have in watching films? In a much debated paper, Roger Scruton argued that this interest typically comes down to the interest in the dramatic representations recorded by such films. Berys Gaut and Catharine Abell criticized Scruton’s argument by claiming that films can elicit an aesthetic interest also by virtue of their pictorial representation. In this article, we develop a different criticism of Scruton’s argument. In our view, a film can elicit an aesthetic interest that does (...) not come down to an interest in the dramatic representation or in the pictorial representation. We will argue that this is a distinctively cinematic interest. In section I we outline Scruton’s argument. In section II we point out an interest in how the cinematic medium presents the portrayed subject as detached from the spectator’s environment. In section III, by referring to Wittgenstein’s account of the contemplation from outside, we contend that the interest in films introduced in section II can count as an aesthetic interest. In section IV we argue that both documentaries and fiction films can elicit this kind of interest. In section V we compare the three different kinds of aesthetic interest that, in our view, a film can elicit. In section VI we describe the corresponding kinds of cinematic achievements. (shrink)

In this paper, we first set out three requirements that each e-theory – a theory whose task is to explain data – must fulfill in order to be one such good theory: i) an ontological requirement, i.e. adequate simplicity, ii) a methodological requirement, i.e. plurality of research procedures, iii) an epistemological requirement, i.e. compatibility with the best available epistemical procedures. Moreover, we will claim that from the metaphilosophical point of view, unlike scientific naturalism on the one hand and supernaturalism on (...) the other, liberal naturalism is the only philosophical approach capable of fulfilling all such requirements. (shrink)

This brief introduction expounds the reasons behind the collection of essays entitled ‘Nature, Value and Normativity’. Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity, due to the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy and/or running against people’s autonomy. Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature constrains human action. (...) The essays of the collection tackle some specific questions about the role of nature in accounts of value and normativity: the fact–value distinction, the relevance of emotions for normativity and values, the role of intersubjectivity in normative theory, as well as free will and action. (shrink)

This article discusses Hilary Putnam's views on the mind-body problem, by locating them in the general context of a satisfying pluralistic naturalism that he tried to articulate throughout his entire philosophical career. The first attempt in this direction was computational functionalism, his version of psychological functionalism centered on the analogy between mind/body and software/hardware, which (differently from David Lewis and others) he came to think of as an empirical hypothesis. That was a very successful proposal; however, later Putnam abandoned it (...) and embraced what he called 'liberal functionalism'. The reason for this change of mind was twofold: on the one hand, Putnam reached the conclusion that computational functionalism was incompatible with his views on semantic externalism; on the other hand, he began to think that mental states, besides being compositionally plastic (i.e., two entities can be in the same psychological state without being in the same physical state), are also computationally plastic (i.e., two entities can be in the same psychological state without being in the same functional state).In conclusion, I will argue that 'liberal functionalism' opened an interesting perspective for a successful non-reductive version of naturalism. (shrink)

Today, the problem of freedom is often framed (consciously or unconsciously) in ways that closely recall the Third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, when this problem is discussed in the framework of the so-called “scientific naturalism,” it becomes the most relevant case of a more general antinomy that opposes our most cherished beliefs about ourselves (those concerning features such as moral responsibility, agency, consciousness, and intentionality) to what we know from the natural sciences, which do not (...) seem to leave room for those beliefs. The way out from this predicament, it is argued, requires abandoning some of the tenets of contemporary scientific naturalism. (shrink)